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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: "DELIBERATE SPEED"
DOCTRINE APPLIED TO DESEGREGATION OF
RECREATIONAL FACILITIES
T HE "deliberate speed" doctrine of Brown v. Board of Education)
which contemplates allowing a delay in the desegregation of public
elementary and secondary schools when certain conditions exist,
was unequivocally applied to cases involving the desegregation ol
public recreational facilities by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit in the recent case of Watson v. City of Memphis.2
Plaintiffs brought a class action against the Memphis Park Com-
mission and others for an injunction immediately restraining the
city from operating and maintaining certain public parks and recrea-
tional facilities on a racially segregated basis. The district court
rendered a judgment denying the injunction but approving a plan
proposed by defendants for the gradual desegregation of certain of
the facilities and ordering the Commission to file, within six months,
a further plan for the desegregation of all recreational facilities of
the city. Plaintiffs appealed on the ground that the law permits no
delay in the desegregation of public parks and recreational facilities.
Defendants at no time questioned the right of plaintiffs to participate
in the use of the recreational facilities on a desegregated basis,8 but
rather they contended that the public interest of both the white and
1349 U.S. 294 (1955).
"[T]he cases are remanded to the District Courts to take such proceedings and enter
such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as are necessary and proper to
admit to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed
the parties to these cases." Id. at 301. (Emphasis added.)
For discussion of such implementation of desegregation, see McKay, "With All
Deliberate Speed'-A Study of School Desegregation, 31 N.Y.U.L. REV. 991 (1956);
McKay, "With All Deliberate Speed": Legislative Reaction and Judicial Development,
1956-1957, 43 VA. L. REv. 1205 (1957); Papale, Judicial Enforcement of Desegregation:
Its Problems and Limitations, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 301 (1957); Comment, 65 YAL.E L.J.
630 (1956); Note, 71 HARV. L. REV. 486 (1958); Note, 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 557 (1954);
Note, 64 YALE L.J. 124 (1954).
2303 F.2d 863 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. granted, 31 U.S.L. Wm.K 3169 (U.S. Nov. 19,
1962) (No. 424).
"We are of the view that the principle stated in Brown v. Board of Education, supra,
relating to the desegregation of schools, is applicable to the present case, involving
the desegregation of recreational facilities in the City of Memphis. In our opinion the
Brown decision is not limited to cases involving public schools .... ." 03 F.2d at 869.
3 See Brief for Defendants-Appellees, pp. 10-11, 17. The respondents, in opposition
to their opponents' petition for certiorari, said: "Respondents fully recognize . . . the
established principle of constitutional law that Negroes are entitled to make use, on a
desegregated basis, of public parks and recreational facilities of the City of Memphis."
Brief of Respondents, p. 1.
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Negro inhabitants of Memphis demanded that desegregation be
implemented gradually. The court of appeals, agreeing with the
Commission, held that the implementation of desegregation "with
all deliberate speed" was warranted in this case.
The fundamental question raised once again by this case is: To
what extent, if at all, may the vindication of already adjudicated
and determined constitutional rights be delayed in furtherance of
the public interest.
Relying on general equitable principles, the Supreme Court has
long recognized and exercised its power to delay remedies where
it appeared that immediate enforcement of claimant's right might
bring about unjustifiable injury.4 The creation of public health
hazards, 5 the imposition of other public hardships, 6 and the sub-
jection of the defendant to an excessive loss without commensurate
benefit to the plaintiff,7 have been held to be such injuries as would
justify gradual implementation. Similarly, in government antitrust
suits, the magnitude and complexity of the interests involved often
require that gradual remedies be employed." A related reason
calling for gradualism in these cases is the possible serious injury
that might result if certain products upon which the public de-
pended were immediately removed from interstate commerce. 9
I For discussion of the Supreme Court's exercise of equity discretion, see Note,
Supreme Court Equity Discretion: The Decrees in the Segregation Cases, 64 YALE L.J.
124 (1954).
5 In Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367 (1929), modified, 281 U.S. 179 (1930), 289
U.S. 395 (1933), 309 U.S. 569, 311 U.S. 107 (1940), the Court, while ruling that the
plaintiff s.tates were entitled to an injunction to prohibit the Sanitary District of
Chicago from diverting water from Lake Michigan, nevertheless ordered a gradual
decree which would allow the Sanitary District a reasonably practicable time within
which to find another means of disposing of sewage. The granting of an immediate
injunction would have involved the risk of a grave health hazard to the public.
8 Organized Village v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 76 (1962). In this case the Court held
that the citizens of two Alaskan Eskimo fishing villages must cease violating a statute
prohibiting the use of fish-traps, but, "in order to avoid hardship," allowed a "stay" to
the end of the 1962 salmon fishing season.
I In Arizona Copper Co. v. Gillespie, 230 U.S. 46 (1913), the defendants were
allowed a reasonable time to alleviate water pollution caused by their mining, because
ordering immediate cessation would have destroyed their industry. See Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907), modified, 237 U.S. 474 (1915), 240 U.S.
650 (1916) (smoke nuisance); Westinghouse Air Brake Co. v. Great Northern Ry., 86
Fed. 132 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1898) (patent infringement).
8 See, e.g., United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316 (1961);
Schine Chain Theaters, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948); United States v.
American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S.
1 (1911).
9 In Standard Oil Co. v. United States, supra note 8, at 81, the Court hoped, by
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None of these cases, however, involved a meritorious claim seek-
ing the protection of personal rights; it is quite another situation for
a court to adjudge that a person has a positive, personal right which
is being unconstitutionally denied him, but that he must, neverthe-
less, await the enjoyment of that right. It was not until the render-
ing of the decision in the second Brown case 10 that the Supreme
-Court was willing to go this far.11
The Brown v. Board cf Education conclusion that "separate edu-
cational facilities are inherently unequal"'12 necessarily affected a
large number of people in the nation's complex public school
system.13 Therefore, in the second Brown decision, the Court
ordered that desegregation of public schools was to be effected, not
allowing reasonable time, to avoid "possible serious injury to result to the public
from an absolute cessation of interstate commerce in petroleum and its products by
such vast agencies as are embraced in the combination...."
An immediate application of the remedy was not made in United States v. American
Tobacco Co., supra note 8, at 187, because, among other things, an injunction pro-
hibiting the movement in interstate commerce of the products produced by the
combination would lead to "a stoppage of supply and a great enhancement of
prices.,
10 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
1See 64 YALE L.J. 124, 126-27 (1954).
The Court had approached most closely the deciding of this question in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). The President, in order to avert a
steel strike which threatened to paralyze the Korean War effort, ordered seizure of
the steel industry. The government contended that, even if the seizure were unconstitu-
tional, the public interest prevented the issuance of an injunction against the seizure.
Instead of ordering that an injunction issue after the government had had time to avert
the emergency, the Court granted immediate relief. Only Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
concurring opinion answered the government's contention: "'Balancing the equities'
when considering whether an injunction should issue, is lawyers' jargon for choosing
between conflicting public interests. When Congress itself has struck the balance,...
a court of equity is not justified in ignoring that pronouncement under the guise of
exercising equitable discretion." Id. at 609-10.
Some state and lower federal court school decisions under Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896), however, did render gradual decrees to allow time for accomplishing
administrative tasks necessary to equalize educational facilities. See, e.g., Davis v.
County School Bd., 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. 1952), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529
(E.D.S.C. 1951), vacated, 342 U.S. 350, modified and aff'd, 103 F. Supp. 920 (E.D.S.C.
1952), rev'd on other grounds as modified sub nom. Brown v. Board of Education, supra;
Wrighten v. Board of Trustees, 72 F. Supp. 948 (E.D.S.C. 1947).
22 "[i]n the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no
place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal." 347 U.S. 483, 495(1954).
13 Forty per cent of the public school pupils in the United States were directly
affected by the Brown decision. In the District of Columbia and the seventeen states
which required segregation, 8,200,000 white children and 2,530,000 Negro children were
attending the schools. N.Y. Times, May 18, 1954, p. 18, col. I.
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immediately, but "with all deliberate speed."'14  Furthermore, be-
cause of the peculiarly local nature of the problems, the Court
determined that the district courts were the appropriate organs to
implement gradual desegregation. It accordingly formulated the
criteria by which the lower courts were to be guided in implementing
such desegregation 15 and remanded the cases to them.
The Supreme Court made it clear that only very practical mat-
ters incident to the services rendered by the public schools were to be
evaluated in determining whether the public interest called for delay
in desegregation. The courts were expressly authorized to consider
problems related to administration-specifically, those arising from
tht physical condition of the school plant, the school transportation
system, personnel, the revision of school districts and attendance
"areas, and the revision of local laws and regulations which might
be necessary in solving such administrative problems.'6
14 Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
It., s interesting to note the varying reactions expressed after the Court handed
:down. the implementing decision. McKay, "With All Deliberate Speed"--A Study of
School Desegregation, supra note 1, at 1000, expresses approval of the delayed imple-
mentation of desegregation. "In this succinct phrase ["with all deliberate -speed']
reposes all the urgency of a democracy impatient to be at its task of equality and
yet all the dignity and wisdom of the equity jurisdiciton, watchful lest a greater
injustice be done in the process of self-defeating haste." For a contrary viewpoint, see
Papale, supra note 1, at 308-09: "Unfortunately this [immediate implement4tion] was
not done in the public school cases.. .. It may be too soon to state with apy great
degre.e of certainty that this was unwise, but certainly all signs point in that. direction."
For discussion of Southern reaction to the implementing decision, -see generally
Collier, Segregation and Politics, in Wrrm ALL DELBERATE SPEED 110, 120-21 (Shoemaker
ed. 1957); Leflar, "Law of the Land," in id. at 1.
25 "In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will be guided by equitable
principles.... Courts of equity may properly take into account the public interest
in the elimination of such obstacles in a systematic and effective manner. But it should
go without saying that the vitality of, these cqxstitutional principles cannot be allowed
to yield simply because of disagreement witll theqn. ,
"While giving weight to these public and pirivate considerations, the courts will
require that the defendants make a prompt and -rea.snable start toward full compliance
with our May 17, 1954, ruling. Once such a start-has been made, the courts may find
that additional time is necessary to carry out the ruling in an effective manner.
The burden rests, upon the defendants to establish that such time is necessary to the
public interest, and is consistent with good faith compliance at the earliest practicable
,date.. To that en. the courts. ay consider proble.rs-gfeated to administration, apssng
Jr.om- .the physical condition.of -the school plaqit,, the. school transportation system,
p.erso*nnel, revision of' school .d.iitricts and atte.ndanq areas into. compact: units to
achieve .a system of determiniing admission to the .public schools on a non-racial basis,
and revision, of local laws and regulations which may be necessary in solving the fore.
-going problems." Brown v. Board of Education, sup.a note, 14, at 300-01.! (Emphasis
added.) - -
26.Ibid. Presumably, the object of weighing these considerations is to avoid the




From 1955 until the present time, the "deliberate speed" doc-
trine has had a significant role in the judicial administration of
public school desegregation.' 7 However, in the higher education
context the courts have specifically rejected its application.' 8 Inas-
much as the admission of Negroes to universities or graduate schools
does not entail the administrative problems that desegregation of
public schools does, there has been no reason for delay.' 9
In areas involving o;zher public facilities in which segregation
had previously been practiced, the courts, even though quickly
adopting the principle that separate facilities are inherently unequal
and thus striking down segregation, have generally not considered
1T Generally, the public school cases subsequent to the second Brown decision
discuss "deliberate speed" implementation. For examples of cases upholding the
defendants' proposed desegregation plans as qualifying under the "deliberate speed"
doctrine, see Hill v. School Bd., 282 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1960) (twelve-year desegrega-
tion period allowed by "deliberate speed"); Calhoun v. Members of Bd. of Educ., 188
F. Supp. 401 (N.D. Ga. 1959) (same). For examples, on the other hand, of plans
that were rejected by the courts because they involved too great delays, see Evans
v. Ennis, 281 F.2d 385 (3rd Cir. 1960) (twelve-year period not allowed); Allen v. County
School Bd., 249 F.2d 462 (4th Cir.), reversing Davis v. County School Bd., 149 F. Supp.
431 (E.D. Va. 1957) (delay excessive, even though, originally, local conditions required
delay); Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 205 F. Supp. 893 (E.D. La. 1962) (board
delayed excessively, so immediate compliance with court-formulated plans required).
An interesting observation appears in Leflar, supra note 14, at 13-14: "The resultant
judicial pattern has varied with geography. In northern and border areas 'all
deliberate speed' has come to mean 'today' or within time limits firmly set. Further
south it means 'soon' or within time limits yet to be fixed. In the Deep South time
limits have not been seriously discussed. Local opinion does not change the rule of
law which the Supreme Court has found in the Constitution and which lower courts
must accept as the high court has stated it, but public opinion does affect the local
administrative factors which the district courts have been directed to consider in apply-
ing the rule."
"
8 The Supreme Court has specified that the decision in the second Brown case
has no application to a case involving admission of a Negro to a state professional
school. "As this case involves the admission of a Negro to a graduate professional
school, there is no reason for delay." Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control,
350 U.S. 413, 414 (1956) (per curiam opinion). In Meredith v. Fair, 305 F.2d 343,
352 (5th Cir.), cert. ddnied, 371 U.S. 828 (1962), the court stated: "As a matter of law,
the principle of 'deliberate speed' has no application at the college level...."
The refusal of the courts to desegregate colleges and graduate schools gradually
was expected because, first, higher education cases decided prior to the Brown cases
ordered immediate desegregation in order to satisfy the "personal and present" rights
of the petitioners. E.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Okla-
homa State Regents, 339 U.S. 657 (1950). Secondly, the integration of institutions of
higher learning does not involve the administrative problems which comprise the
criteria necessary for delay in public school desegregation. Universities are not troubled
by such problems as redistricting of attendance areas or providing school transportation
systems. Furthermore, universities, desegregated or not, are not required to admit
more students than they have physical facilities and personnel to handle.
19 See note 18 supra.
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the possibility of delay in the implementation of desegregation.20 A
probable explanation for this is that the courts recognized that the
situations involved in those cases also lacked the factors that were
present in the Brown and other public school cases and which must
be present in order to justify a delayed remedy.
Detroit Housing Comm'n v. Lewis21 was relied upon in the in-
stant case as authority for the proposition that the "deliberate speed"
doctrine is not limited in application to cases involving public
schools.2 2  In that case, defendant Housing Commission, appealing
from the decision of the district court requiring desegregation of
public housing units, argued that the Commission ought to be
allowed reasonable time within which to complete the ordered de-
segregation. The appellate court interpreted the lower court's judg-
ment to mean that defendants were required immediately to cease
maintaining separate lists of eligible Negro and white housing appli-
cants and denying such applicants the right to lease solely because of
their race. The resulting change in occupancy might be effected
gradually as determined by the normal rate of turn-over among the
occupants of the housing unitsPas Even though the court said that
the doctrine of "deliberate speed" was being applied, it is highly im-
probable that any greater immediacy would have been required if
there had been no "reliance" on the doctrine.24 This case, then, does
20 Dawson v. Mayor & City Council, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir.), affd per curiam, 350
U.S. 877 (1955). "With this [Brown decision] in mind, it is obvious that racial
segregation in recreational activities can no longer be sustained .... " Id. at 387. In
Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879, vacating per curiam, 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir.
1955), the Supreme Court vacated the judgments below upholding segregation in the
use of a public golf course and remanded the case to the district court to be decided
in conformity with the Dawson case.
For other decisions banning segregation in public facilities, see, e.g., Muir v.
Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954), vacating 202 F.2d 275 (6th
Cir. 1953) (attendance at performances held in public park); New Orleans City
Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir.), aff'd per curiam, 358
U.S. 54 (1958) (public parks); Department of Conservation & Dev. v. Tate, 231 F.2d
615 (4th Cir.). cert. denied, 352 U.S. 838 (1956) (same); Dorsey v. State Athletic
Comm'n, 168 F. Supp. 149 (E.D. La. 1958), aff'd per curiam, 359 U.S. 533 (1959)
(participation of whites and Negroes in athletic contests); Browder v. Gayle, 142 F.
Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala.). aff'd per curiam, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (public transportation).
21226 F,2d 180 (6th Cir. 1955).
" 303 F.2d at 869. See also Cummings v. City of Charleston, 288 F.2d 817 (4th
Cir. 1961) (dictum) (remedy could be delayed if justifying circumstances appeared).
" 226 F.2d at 184.
"2The higher education cases, which talk in terms of "immediacy," are perhaps
analogous to this case in that the universities were required immediately, upon the
handing down of the judgment, to consider the applications of Negro students on their
merits, without regard to race or color, but were not required to admit the qualified
Vol. 1963: 350]
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not negative the conclusion that, prior to Watson, the "deliberate
speed" doctrine was restricted to public school cases, presumably
because it was in this context that the administrative problems con-
templated by the Supreme Court in the second Brown decision were
found.
The city of Memphis not only maintains parks, golf courses, and
other recreational facilities for its inhabitants to use as they see fit,
but also provides an extensive playground system with personnel to
organize and direct recreational activities. It is thus readily ap-
parent, that to some extent, the administrative problems contem.
plated in the Brown case are present here. In considering these
problems, the court in Watson 25 acknowledged the complexity of
the recreational system maintained by the city.20 After so doing,
it found that the city had been making both a good faith effort and
considerable progress in bringing about desegregation of its recrea-
tion facilities and that immediate desegregation would probably
result in the closing of many of these facilities because of the in-
creased personnel that would be required to supervise integrated
playgrounds. 27
The court, however, did not stop with a consideration of the
administrative problems involved. In addition to those, the Watson
opinion held that other considerations which may be weighed by the
courts in determining whether the gradual implementation of
already adjudicated personal constitutional rights are the good will
and understanding previously obtaining between the races; and
the avoidance of confusion and turmoil and the maintenance of law
and order in the community during the transition period.28  After
considering the foregoing factors in the context of the holding that
the application of "deliberate speed" was not limited to school
desegregation cases, the court held that gradual implementation
was justified in this case.2 The court's rationale was that immediate
students until the beginning of the next school term. See Florida ex rel. Hawkins v.
Board'of Control, 350 U.S. 413 (1956) (per curiam opinion); Meredith v. Fair, 305 F2d
343 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 US. 828 (1962).2
5,,[i]t is proper for the Court to consider (1) local conditions and local problems
as to facilities, and teacher or supervisory personnel, as well as local problems of
maintaining, during the transition period, maximum recreational facilities for all
dtizens .... ." 303 F.2d at 869 (quoting court below).
20 Id. at 865.
27 Id. at 870.
28 Id. at 869.
'Id. at 869-70.
[Vol. 1963: 50,
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desegregation would create not only administrative problems, but
also the dangers of confusion and violence, increased antagonism
between members of the two races, and the necessity for added police
protection.P0
That the Sixth Circuit overstepped its authority, in adding to
the criteria that may be considered by the courts in determining the
necessity for delay of desegregation, is indicated by two important
points. First, the Supreme Court, in applying the "deliberate speed"
doctrine in the Brown case, specifically limited the criteria to be
considered by the courts to administrative problems.8 1 The factors
added by the court in the instant case are clearly not of an adminis-
trative nature, but rather are policy matters, the consideration of
which would allow broad discretion on the part of the courts.
Second, the last factor authorized for the court's consideration in
the Watson case is the avoidance of confusion and turmoil and the
maintenance of order. It has long been the law that a person's con-
stitutional rights cannot be sacrificed or their recognition delayed for
this reason. 32
The effect of the decision in Watson v. City of Memphis, then,
could be more profound than is indicated by its extension of the
doctrine of "deliberate speed" to other than public school cases.
The decision substantially increases the breadth of criteria which a
-o Id. at 868, 870. Judge McAllister emphasized the point that the plaintiffs did
not question any of the city's evidence sustaining these findings, but rather regarded
it as irrelevant. Id. at 868.
s' 349 U.S. at 300-01.
"Any consideration of possible violence or disruption of relations was rejected
in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). The Court, in ruling on the desegregation
of the Little Rock schools, held: "L]aw and order are not here to be preserved by
depriving the Negro children of their constitutional rights." Id. at 16.
In Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 81 (1917), holding discriminatory municipal
zoning invalid, the Court stated: "It is urged that this proposed segregation will
promote public peace by preventing race conflicts. Desirable as this is, and important
as is the preservation of the public peace, this aim cannot be accomplished by laws or
ordinances which deny rights created or protected by the Federal Constitution."
When people are led to act illegally because an individual exercises his legal right;
it is proper procedure to protect the legal right, if necessary by punishing those who
use illegal means to oppose it. See Sellers v. Johnson, 163 F.2d 877, 883 (8th Cir.
1947), where the court held that the police were not entitled, in order to avoid
public conflict, to prevent the Jehovah's Witnesses from holding a meeting. The
police should have acted, instead, against the mob which threatened violence.
See also Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496
(1939); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). But cf. Feiner v. New York, 340
U.S. 315 (1951).
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court may consider in determining whether "deliberate speed" may
be employed in the implementation of the appropriate remedy for
an adjudicated right. Relying on the additional criteria, a court
could effect delays in desegregation for reasons not previously
allowed. This would, in effect, allow the courts almost unlimited
latitude in deciding whether gradual desegregation is warranted in
a particular case.
The Supreme Court, in the public school cases, has answered the
question initially asked by holding that the vindication of already
adjudicated personal rights may be delayed for the furtherance of
the public interest, not when the public disagrees with the action or
when the delay would help to maintain order, but rather when the
presence of administrative problems makes the implementation of
immediate desegregation impracticable. If, then, the Brown factors
were present in a case involving desegregation of a public facility
other than public schools, as in the instant case, it would appear
to be unreasonable to deny the applicability of "deliberate speed"
simply because of the type of public facility involved. Therefore,
strict adherence to the criteria established by the Supreme Court in
Brown v. Board of Education, rather than consideration of the
public facility involved, should be the determinant as to whether
desegregation may be implemented gradually. On this basis only,
because of the administrative problems involved therein, the result
in the instant case may be a proper one. However, because of the
improper criteria considered in its determination, Watson v. City of
Memphis should be vacated and remanded for decision as to
whether the administrative problems incident to the desegregation
of these public recreational facilities warrant the application of the
doctrine of "deliberate speed."
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